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A B S T R A C T
The Russian history of politicization of natural gas supplies led Europe to seek alternatives. US LNG is considered
to be a viable alternative for Europe, which positioned the US as a strong competitor against Russia. In a game
theoretic approach, we model this strategic decision-making process in simultaneous-move and sequential
games. Our findings indicate a mixed strategy equilibrium: Europe cannot commit to diversify in the face of
Russian advantages, and Russia cannot fully resist the temptation to politicize its supplies to Europe. The US
might attempt to intervene in the European commitment problem through implementing sanctions on Russian
gas sales. We find that in any case episodic Russian politicization remains likely in equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Many energy security studies council avoidance of excessive de-
pendence on one supplier [1–3]. For Europe this implies reducing de-
pendence on Russian natural gas by diversifying suppliers both via pi-
peline and through LNG regasification terminals. The urgency of such
diversification was brought home in the last two decades by Russian
politicization: repeated Russian supply interruptions and Russian de-
mands aimed at achieving political and economic ends using the
leverage provided by Russia's dominant supply position. The central
question of this paper is whether, and to what extent, the U.S. shale gas
boom, combined with European and U.S. strategic policy actions can
contain Russia's capacity to politicize its position as a supplier to the
European gas market.
Historically, there are three main regional natural gas markets:
Europe, North America and Japan. These markets have become in-
creasingly integrated [4] through the global LNG market, in which the
U.S. is becoming a significant player [5]. Fifty six U.S. LNG export
applications have been approved in the lower 48 states, with a total
approved capacity of 58.16 bcf/d for FTA countries and 30.52 bcf/d for
non-FTA countries [6] – an annual LNG export capacity of 21,228 bcf
for FTA countries and 11,140 for non-FTA countries. While not all
approved facilities are likely to be developed, the approved capacity is
larger than the entire global LNG trade in 2017.
The shale gas boom in the U.S. has transformed parts of the global
energy market. The U.S. shift from net importer [7] to net exporter
(illustrated in Chart 1) [8–10] has altered global natural gas markets
[11–13]. European natural gas demand and U.S. LNG exports are ar-
guably a perfect match [14,15].
As the U.S. shale gas boom developed, studies and policy papers
discussed using the U.S. shale gas boom to help European allies [7,17],
evaluated feasible alternative destinations for the U.S. LNG exports
[18,19] and considered Russia's counter-strategies to prevent U.S. LNG
competition in its markets [20,21]. And some of these possibilities have
begun to be realized. U.S. and European LNG terminals have been de-
veloped, with support from a variety of investors and governments.1
Russia has in turn developed new pipeline routes for export to Europe
that increase export capacity and reduce reliance on Eastern European
transit corridors along with developing natural gas liquefaction capacity
and pipeline capacity to Asian markets [7]. The China-Russian Power of
Siberia pipeline with 38 billion cubic meters supply annually [22] was
expected to start in late 2019, and Russia has attempted other deals [23].
These developments have been examined in the literature on the
global natural gas market. The economic literature includes models of
global and regional gas market dynamics [11–13,24]. The overall
market is complex and best modeled using agent based models [24,25].
In addition to Europe, the other developing major import market is the
Asia-Pacific region, which projections indicate may become a very large
market in the long run [26–29]. Climate change constraints are ex-
pected to catalyze rising Asian demand as well [27].
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A few studies in the literature look at the trilateral competition and
cooperation between Russia, European countries and the U.S. in detail.
Medlock, Jaffe, and O'Sullivan [12] study the impacts of U.S. LNG in the
global gas market with a detailed analysis of its outcome in the Eur-
opean gas market in “liberalization” and “North American export push”
scenarios. Their findings indicate that U.S. LNG does not necessarily
save the European gas market only by pushing American exports. Ra-
ther, it would secure Europe better and make Russia worse in a liber-
alization scenario, in which the global gas market is assumed to be
liberalized by unwinding all long-term contracts between 2020 and
2025 and making international capital flow more liquid, which pro-
motes the growth of the market globally. Price projections suggest U.S.
LNG will help Europe and other U.S. trading partners in the liberal-
ization case as it provides low-priced natural gas. Guo and Hawkes [24]
use game-theoretic market equilibrium and contract-driven investment
in the global gas trade using agent-based simulation to understand how
U.S. LNG would affect the global gas market in conservative North-
American and aggressive North-American investment scenarios. The
aggressive scenario is found to be better for the European energy
market while the conservative scenario is expected to make Europe
worse off by causing gas supply tightness. These studies suggest Eur-
opean energy security gains from expansion of U.S. gas exports under
more liberalized market conditions.
But is expanded U.S. and global LNG supply enough? Despite a
growing U.S. role, Russia retains a powerful position. The marginal
cost of pipeline-delivered Russian gas will be lower than the cost of
U.S. and most other imported LNG except perhaps Qatari and Nigerian
LNG for the foreseeable future because of the much higher transport
costs entailed by liquefaction, shipment, and regasification [30]. This
price advantage gives Russia enduring leverage in the European
market.
We base our scenarios for the future of European, Russian, U.S., and
global interaction in this natural gas market on findings of prior si-
mulation and game theoretic studies. We then use game theory to study
how political and economic factors strategically interact to shape
whether and in what contexts Russia can extract political leverage from
its role as a key natural gas supplier to Europe. We move beyond prior
studies partly by placing politics more at the center and examining
emerging additional moves (e.g. U.S. sanctions). We also expand be-
yond previous studies by modeling the credibility dilemmas concerning
politicization and diversification that imply ongoing cycles of co-
operation and conflict between Russia and Europe even in the face of
substantial global LNG market development.
While we affirm prior studies concerning the potential role of U.S.
export capacity in discouraging Russian politicization of gas supplies
we also highlight the enduring challenges associated with preventing a
dominant supplier with low marginal costs from extracting concessions.
Our analysis offers a cautionary note that even a large and liquid in-
ternational market combined with U.S. sanctions is unlikely to fully
deter Russian politicization. This reflects cost-challenges for the sus-
tainability of European diversification, and unreliability in equilibrium
of Russian promises not to politicize or exploit its market power.
2. Strategic context
Game theoretic models are particularly useful when they provide
insights into counter-factual possibilities that shape the strategic in-
centives of the players. The sections below develop our game and sce-
narios. Section 3 examines the core game, and Section 4 embeds this
game in a broader political and economic context.
Our core analysis involves the Nash equilibrium of a strategic form
game (Chart 2) played between Europe and Russia. In the core game,
Russia decides whether to politicize natural gas exports to Europe by
exploiting market power for political and economic ends, and Europe
decides whether to use potentially costly policy levers to diversify
natural gas suppliers in order to resist Russian pressure or not.
Russia and Europe move simultaneously: neither knows the other's
choice when it moves.2 The relative ranking of the associated payoffs (a, b,
c, d for Russia and e, f, g, h for Europe) and the associated Nash equilibria
depend upon broader global gas market conditions, as we will discuss in
Section 3 scenarios. Each scenario begins with a draw that determines the
differential between Russian pipeline gas prices and alternative energy
supply options, the availability of export/import capacity, and the pre-
sence of sanctions restricting Russian gas imports into Europe.
We then generalize the game by considering prior moves by the
United States, Russia, Qatar, and other LNG suppliers that could help
set the conditions of the core Russia-Europe game in Section 4.
Fig. 1depicts the full game examined there, in which Russia selects its
pricing policy, and the U.S. chooses whether to impose sanctions,
jointly setting up play of various scenarios in the core game.
3. The core Russia-Europe game
3.1. Russia's options and payoffs
The European natural gas market is important for Russia. Russian
state-owned Gazprom makes almost half of its total natural gas sales to
EU countries through pipelines (7865 bcf out of 16,817 bcf total natural
gas exports).3 Natural gas sales accounted for 3% of the total GDP while
oil exports’ share was 14% in 2013. The share of total natural gas ex-
ports in total export revenue of Russia is 14%. European countries
constitute half of this 14% [31,32]. If European customers boycotted
natural gas from Russia the direct effect would be a 1.5% decrease in
total GDP. It is very likely that “the EU and Russia will remain strongly
interdependent in the gas sector for at least another 10–15 years” [33].
Russia has a history of politicizing its natural gas sales by cutting its
exports to the European market in 2006 [34], 2009 [35] and 2014 [36].
Russia argues that the aim was to punish Ukraine, not the European
market. Ukraine has been a transit route for Russian natural gas exports
because it holds the most feasible transit route between Russia and Europe.
Being a transit country gave Ukraine the opportunity to get Russian natural
gas although Russia aimed to send it to the Western European countries.
Russia does not want Ukraine to have such a power because of its natural
gas debts to Russia. Therefore, Russia has moved to develop two alternative
pipelines; the Nord Stream and the South Stream. The Nord Stream project
was completed in 2012 as two pipelines that have 1940 bcf transport ca-
pacity annually. An expansion of this pipeline (Nord Stream II) aimed to
double this capacity by the end of 2019 [37,38]. South Stream was can-
celled by Russia in December 2014. Instead, Russia decided to increase the
capacity of the existing Blue Stream, which moves Russian natural gas to
Turkey. The projected capacity of the new pipeline project, which is called
the Turkish Stream, is announced as 2225 bcf per year. It has the same goal
as the South Stream; moving Russian natural gas to Europe while keeping
the Ukraine out of the trade. Although contemporary political events be-
tween Turkey and Russia temporarily affected this project's status [39]
Turkey attempted normalized political relations and the Turkish Stream
project went on [40]. These daily policy changes depending on con-
temporary political events, show how daily foreign policy issues and energy
assets are related in Russian politics. In other words, they indicate how
Russia tends to politicize its energy exports.
Russia's ability to politicize natural gas is contingent upon its market
power, and the need to protect its market position may curtail Russia's
2 Simultaneous moves are used here to reflect the difficulty Russia has com-
mitting to a specific course of action (e.g. not politicizing), and the difficulty
Europe has committing to diversify (as illustrated by the development of the
Nord Stream II, for instance). Europe and Russia also move simultaneously in
order to avoid biasing results by placing once first, as this preserves the max-
imum range of possible equilibria and reflects the difficulty each has commit-
ting to a particular course of action.
3 Pipelines move the vast majority of the Russian natural gas: although LNG
exports are expanding (174.4 bcf in 2016) they remain modest [31].
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opportunities to politicize. Russia has complied with buyer requests to
renegotiate and reduced its prices in order to secure its market position
in the European natural gas market [32]. Russia also has ability to
implement a strategy that will hurt itself in the short term, but will
provide benefits in the long term by actuating a price war in an attempt
to deter competitors from entering its current markets [21] although as
global LNG capacity develops, Russia may not be able to avoid having
global LNG prices partially contain its opportunities to both set prices
and impose political conditions.
3.2. Russia's payoffs
We consider two Russia versions with differing payoffs, a “benign”
and “belligerent” Russia. The only difference in the payoffs across the
two involves how highly Russia values politicizing. In the benign Russia
scenario, Russia prefers to avoid politicizing if politicizing leads Europe
to diversify. Hence the ranking of the payoffs for Russia is a≻c≻ d≻ b
and Russia prefers moderating its behavior in order to maintain its
market position. In the belligerent Russia scenario, Russia prefers to
press ahead with politicization even if it believes that politicization will
drive European diversification so the payoff ranking is a≻b≻ c≻ d. This
second type of Russia may behave defiantly as during the period of
Western sanctions following the conflict in Ukraine. It may want to
demonstrate how strong it is by resisting policy change when threa-
tened by the U.S. and Europe [41].
4. Europe's choice to diversify
Europe faces increasing import demand and vulnerable natural gas
supply security [42]. Over time Europe has come to rely heavily on
imports [19] to meet its natural gas demand in the face declining local
production as illustrated in Chart 3. Increased dependence brought
security challenges including changes in supply of natural gas (e.g.
Libya), the non-uniform pricing of Russian Gazprom, insufficient sto-
rage capacity, oil-based natural gas price structure, and increasing LNG
competition, especially Japan's increasing LNG demand after the 2010
Fukushima nuclear disaster [43].
As Chart 4 shows, Europe is heavily dependent on Russian gas.
Russia is the leading supplier of the EU countries, providing 27.7% of
the total EU countries' natural gas supplies [44].4 In some countries like
Hungary, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Slovakia,5 all natural gas de-
mand is met by Russia. Germany, which consumes the largest amount
of natural gas among the EU countries, receives 48.9% of its total
natural gas supplies from Russia [44]. Germany's locomotive position
for European industry makes sole dependence on Russian natural gas
particularly problematic. Some argue that Russia is less likely to shut
down gas supply to Germany because of high import dependency [2].
However, import dependency could increase German vulnerability to
Russian politicization. For Europe, reducing dependence is most critical
if Russia keeps politicizing and diversifies its own buyers [1,3], but
diversification may come at a cost.
Europe's diversification options include most centrally and most
immediately substitution of other natural gas supplies using LNG im-
ports and pipelines from other sources where feasible. The cost of such
substitution depends both on the availability of relevant capacity and
infrastructure, and on the relative prices for alternative energy supplies
versus Russian pipeline gas [45,46].
5. Energy market scenarios
We examine three scenarios involving Russian politicization and
European diversification under different global LNG market and policy
contexts. These scenarios build on the literature in which scholars have
studied global models of the natural gas market. table 1
Scenario 1 assumes that the Russian gas price and the global LNG
prices available to Europe as a substitute are comparable (whether both
being high or low), and both global liquefaction and European re-
gasification LNG infrastructure is adequate to substitute cheaply from
Russian gas to other sources. This is the likely pattern if prices is set
from a common global referent such as spot prices. It would arise if
Russian prices adjust with shifts in global or European LNG prices. This
scenario could also arise if global natural gas exporters cooperate to set
prices as has been explored in the literature under the rubric of a
Fig. 1. Game tree of the full game.
4 The other major natural gas suppliers of Europe are Norway, Algeria and
Qatar. Their total supply percentages are 26.8%, 8.4% and 5.1% respectively in
the total natural gas supply of the EU-28 countries [44].
5 Hungary and Slovakia's percentages of Russian supplies in total net supplies
is more than 100% because they re-export some amount of natural gas bought
from Russia.
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possible GasOPEC [47,48].
In this context, the costs for Europe of substituting LNG for Russian
natural gas are relatively modest. Hence, the European ranking of the
alternatives is g≻ h≻ f≻ e. Europe's first choice is for Russia to provide
reliable low cost supplies without politicizing (g), but because Europe
has low cost alternatives, its second preference is to diversify (h), even
if Russia is not politicizing. Europe's least preferred alternative is to not
diversify in the face of Russian politicization.
To illustrate the payoffs in numeric form, Chart 5 translates the
ordinal payoffs from Chart 2 into numeric quantities from 1 (least
preferred) to 4 (most preferred).
The Nash equilibrium in the benign Russia version of Scenario 1 is a
mixed strategy equilibrium – both players are expected to play a
combination of their strategies: Europe will sometimes (or partially)
diversify, while Russia will sometimes (or partially) politicize. This
reflects the incentives for Russia to politicize to take advantage of
market power when Europe is not (sufficiently) diversified, and the
incentives for Europe to take advantage of readily available outside
options when Russian politicization becomes too onerous. By contrast
the belligerent Russia payoffs lead to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The belligerent Russia has a dominant strategy: to politicize, and in
response to consistent politicization, Europe prefers to diversify.
This game highlights the commitment problems faced by both
Russia and Europe. If Europe could commit to diversification, it could
prevent Russia from politicizing in the benign Russia scenario. But if
Russia isn't politicizing at-the-moment (or versus certain countries) this
commitment to diversifying can be difficult to maintain. For instance,
in 2019 it appeared that the economic benefits to Germany associated
with for making money as a hub for Russian gas trade were helping
drive German policy away from diversification despite objections from
some other European states. While Germany stood to gain benefits from
becoming a major hub for Russian gas with Nord Stream 2, other
countries (including alternative transit corridors like Ukraine and
Poland) stood to suffer economic penalties, and Russia appeared to be
rushing to complete Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream pipelines ahead of
contract renewal with these countries.
When Russian gas lacks a cost advantage (Scenario 1), there are
nonetheless opportunities for politicization, although (as the mixed
strategy equilibrium suggests) this politicization is likely to be episodic,
with European efforts to diversify similarly punctuated by periods of
increased reliance on Russian gas. In this scenario, Europe will vacillate
between efforts to protect itself from the political and economic risks
that accompany dependence on Russian gas and the acceptance of those
risks. Russia in turn will alternate periods of politicization with periods
in which it is a relatively reliable supplier offering fuel at a competitive
price.6
Scenario 2, illustrated in assumes that diversification away from
Russian gas is more costly for Europe. Here Russian gas prices are
substantially lower than global LNG prices or global LNG infrastructure
or supplies are inadequate such that Europe cannot substitute from
Russian gas to other sources without paying a significant premium. This
is akin to the low U.S. production scenarios developed by Guo and
Hawkes [24]. It could also arise if contracts are written to lock in a low
cost of Russian gas relative to available alternative European import
supplies. Other developments (e.g. Panama Canal expansion or spikes
in Asian demand) could also contribute on the margins [49,50].
Because in this context Europe's cost of substituting LNG for Russian
natural gas are relatively high, Europe is willing to accept a degree of
Russian politicization without diversifying. Hence, the European
ranking of the alternatives is g≻ h≻ e≻ f. Europe's first choice is for
Russia to provide reliable low cost supplies without politicizing (g), but
because Europe lacks low cost alternatives, its least preferred alter-
native is to attempt to diversify in the face of Russian politicization:
accepting a degree of Russian politicization is preferable to a costly but
at least partly futile attempt to diversify in the face of politicization.7
The Nash equilibrium for both versions of Russia's payoffs in
Scenario 2 involves Russian politicization accompanied by European
abdication in the form of failing to diversify. When the costs of
Chart 1. U.S. Natural gas net exports (billion cubic feet) [www.eia.gov] [16].
Chart 2. Core Russia-Europe game matrix.
6 In repeated play, the Nash threats folk theorem implies the possibility of
more cooperation – Russian play of not politicizing and European play of not
diversifying would be sustained by mutual recognition of the advantages of this
outcome over the uncertainty of the mixed strategy.
7 Arguably we might also expect somewhat different Russian rankings of the
alternatives in this scenario. Because Russia has a sufficient price advantage
that its customers will not leave even in the face of politicization, ‘benign’
Russia's payoffs might well shift in this scenario to a ≻ c≻ b≻ d since even if
Europe attempts to diversify, Russia's market power means it can still poten-
tially extract political concessions. However, changing the ranking in this way
has no effect on the equilibrium outcome.
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diversification are sufficiently high relative to the cost of Russian gas,
Russia can potentially exploit the differential by politicizing gas sup-
plies to Europe. Russia can extract political or economic concessions
from Europe as a condition for continuing to provide pipeline gas under
favorable terms.
Scenario 3, illustrated in Chart 7, assumes that the cost of Russian
gas is high relative to the cost of diversifying. It might perhaps arise in
the context of an extreme version of the Guo and Hawkes [24] high U.S.
production scenario, if augmented by surprisingly successful gas field
development elsewhere (e.g. in the eastern Mediterranean). It could
also arise if Russian delivery contracts with Europe lock in a high price
for Russian gas. The scenario could also arise in the presence of Eur-
opean or U.S. sanctions that raise the effective cost of using Russian
sources.
Because in this context the costs for Europe of substituting LNG for
Russian natural gas are very low, Europe is unwilling to accept any
degree of Russian politicization without diversifying. Indeed, Europe's
preference is to diversify no matter what Russia does. Europe's ranking
in this scenario is h≻ g≻ f≻ e, which implies a dominant strategy to
diversify.
In this scenario, Europe always chooses to diversify. In equilibrium,
benign Russia responds to this situation by not politicizing in order to
protect what market share it can. The belligerent Russia responds to this
scenario by politicizing, producing a Nash equilibrium at politicize,
diversify.
Considered together, the three scenarios highlight key points about
the likely extent of continuing Russian politicization, and the potential
for European diversification in response. Periodic swings in the global
LNG market will create windows of security and vulnerability for
Europe. When Russia has a price-advantage relative to alternative fuel
sources (Scenario 2), this advantage can be exploited to extract political
concessions should Russia choose to do so. When Russia is at a price
disadvantage (Scenario 3), its type as either belligerent or benign will
be most clearly revealed, with the belligerent type continuing efforts to
politicize while the benign type attempts to preserve market position by
eschewing politicization in the face of European diversification. When
prices are competitive (Scenario 1), a mixed strategy is possible in
which both diversification and politicization are episodic.
6. Extending the strategic context
Several actors in the global natural gas marketplace could select
strategies that increase the likelihood that one or another of the sce-
narios described in Section 3 will arise. Consequently, in this section we
expand the game to analyze these strategies.
Russia's relatively low cost of production and delivery to the
Chart 3. Europe's natural gas consumption and imports between 1990 and 2017 [42].
Chart 4. Russia's percentage in EU countries' natural gas supplies in 2014 [44].
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European market gives it substantial potential price flexibility. Russia
has complied with buyer requests to renegotiate and reduced its prices
in order to secure its market position in the European natural gas
market [32]. Russia also has the ability to implement a strategy that
will hurt itself in the short term, but may provide benefits in the long
term by actuating a price war in an attempt to deter competitors from
entering its current markets [21]. Ironically, extensive Russian ac-
commodation in price negotiations could be a warning sign that Eur-
opean political and economic vulnerabilities to future politicization are
part of the broader ‘bargain’.
Global LNG suppliers could also potentially attempt to influence the
relative costs of diversification for Europe either by dropping prices or
by paying for the construction of gasification plants in Europe. There is
some evidence that they have done so – both Qatar and global energy
companies have invested in the construction of regasification plants in
Europe. By reducing the costs of diversification for Europe, such in-
vestments could help shift from Scenario 2 to Scenario 1 or even Scenario
3. Both Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 are more desirable for global LNG
suppliers because they contain European diversification decisions that
lead to higher LNG sales. Hence, an equilibrium in which the game
Table 1
Three Scenarios of Russian politicization and European diversification.
The price of Russian natural gas relative to LNG prices available to Europe Adequacy of European LNG infrastructure to diversify
Scenario 1 Competitive Adequate
Scenario 2 Low Adequate/Inadequate
Scenario 3 High Adequate
Chart 5. Russia-Europe game illustrative payoffs for scenario 1.
Chart 6. Russia-Europe game illustrative payoffs for scenario 2.
Chart 7. Russia-Europe game illustrative payoffs for scenario 3.
Chart 8. Likely scenario outcomes from U.S. and Russian
first-stage choices.
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remains in Scenario 2 simply because of inadequate global infra-
structure is unlikely, and we do not explicitly model the choice to build
this infrastructure.
The United States appears to be considering expanded sanctions
against Russian natural gas exports8 [51]. U.S. sanctions, if sufficiently
effective, could shift Europe to Scenario 3 in which diversification of
suppliers becomes Europe's dominant choice. Since the U.S. appears to
fear Russian political influence derived from the gas trading relation-
ship with its European allies and in addition the U.S. and other global
LNG providers would potentially benefit from increased European di-
versification, sanctions aimed at Russian natural gas suppliers could
potentially be a desirable tactic for the U.S., although the desirability of
this tactic likely depends upon the extent to which imposing sanctions
would weaken the U.S. relationship with European countries.
To explore the consequences of Russian pricing choices and U.S.
sanctions choices we now model a first stage simultaneous game be-
tween the U.S. and Russia with consequences associated with the sce-
narios likely to follow in the Russia-Europe game already studied. This
is the top half of the full game tree shown in Fig. 1. The lower subgames
are the scenarios that arise from these choices.
We now make some assumptions concerning the relative ranking of
the scenarios for the U.S. and Russia, as summarized in Chart 8. All else
equal, Russia would rather play Scenario 1 or 2 and most dislikes
Scenario 3. In Scenario 2 Russia has market power and the opportunity
to politicize in Europe, and in Scenario 3 Russia is priced out of the
European market. Similarly, all else equal the U.S. would rather play
Scenario 3 in which Russia is priced out of the European market, and
most dislikes Scenario 2 in which Russia is able to use its market power
to consistently extract political concessions in Europe. Whether Russia
prefers Scenario 1 or Scenario 2 depends in part on the magnitude of
the price concessions required to shift Europe to a dominant strategy of
not diversifying, and we consider both possibilities below, again la-
beling these as the belligerent and non-belligerent Russia cases since
they reflect the relative benefits Russia believes it can gain from poli-
tical and economic leverage with Europe.
The ordinal rankings of that result are displayed in Chart 9. We
assume that the U.S. and Russia move simultaneously to allow each to
optimally select its strategy conditional upon the other's move. The
Nash Equilibrium is in bold face.
In the unique Nash equilibrium that arises in this game the U.S.
imposes sanctions but Russia counters the sanctions with low prices. In
the full subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resulting combination of
costs and benefits sets up Scenario 1 in the second stage. As discussed
above, Scenario 1 has cyclic variation between Russian politicization
and non-politicization, and the associated European alternation be-
tween efforts at diversification and purchase of Russian gas, as dis-
cussed above in the benign Russia case, and a combination of Russian
politicization and European diversification in the belligerent case.9
7. Conclusion
Fully deterring Russian politicization of its natural gas market to
Europe is difficult, even in the context of a large and competitively
priced global LNG market. In most scenarios Europe could meet its
natural gas supply with LNG, but it is likely to be more expensive than
Russian pipeline gas. Russian gas will have lower costs, and thus the
Russians could win a price war if they chose. As Scenario 1 shows, this
is likely to set up a mixed strategy equilibrium in which Russia and
Europe both face commitment problems: Europe cannot consistently
diversify in the face of Russian advantages as a supplier, and Russia
cannot fully resist the temptation to politicize its supply to Europe.
However, the presence of alternative supply does make a supply cutoff
or sharp price increase less likely – it moderates Russian politicization
by making Scenario 2 less likely.
This study used strategic and extensive form games to analyze the
strategic interactions between U.S. LNG sales and sanctions, Russian
pricing and politicization decisions, and European energy diversifica-
tion decisions. In the core game, Russia decides whether to politicize,
and Europe decides whether to buy high volumes of Russian gas or
diversify its sources. The payoffs and outcome of that game are in turn
shaped by the global LNG market and by policy choices. We modeled
the U.S. choice to sanction Russian gas suppliers and the Russian choice
to set prices as a prior simultaneous move game and used the subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium to determine the equilibrium of the overall
extensive form game, one characterized by a mixed strategy between
Russia and Europe in which cooperation is complicated.
Consistent with some of the previous literature, the results speak to
the importance of global LNG prices and market infrastructure. In the
absence of a large and competitive global LNG infrastructure with
Chart 9. Expected ordinal payoffs of U.S. and Russian first-stage choices.
8 Nord Stream 2 pipeline prompted the U.S. consider sanctioning Russian
natural gas sales after Russia expanded its pipeline capacity to West Europe.
This pipeline hurts the interests of U.S. LNG exporters as it will help Russia to
maintain its existing market power in the European natural gas market by
providing a long-term contract for cheaper natural gas supply.
9 Alternative assumptions support the same conclusion about Scenario 1 as an
outcome. If imposing sanctions for the U.S. is sufficiently costly, this can shift
the equilibrium, particularly if Russia has the ‘benign’ payoffs. In this scenario,
a possible alternative equilibrium emerges in which Russia sets its prices
competitively, and the U.S. chooses not to sanction, leading to Scenario 1 in the
second round.
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export capacity able to facilitate European diversification, Russia's
ability to politicize its market power would be considerably more
substantial. From this perspective, the increasing supply of global LNG
available for export to Europe on relatively competitive terms that the
U.S. shale gas boom helped bring about has weakened Russian leverage,
and likely reduced the frequency of politicization.
Thereby, the benefits of U.S. export opportunities can remain im-
portant even in the absence of major LNG flows from the U.S. directly to
Europe. Even if U.S. LNG flows are directed to more profitable markets
beyond Europe [52] at times [18,19], retention of the right degree of
global market flexibility is key to European energy security, as Medlock
et al. [12]. have noted. Appropriate flexibility allows large quantities of
LNG to be redirected from Asian to European markets in the event of a
reduction in Russian gas flows or a spike in gas prices while (in some
scenarios) providing incentives to discourage Russian politicization.
Some of the more novel insights that emerge from this analysis
speak to the difficulties of fully containing Russian politicization of its
position as a major supplier in the European natural gas market. First,
global LNG prices competitive with Russian gas prices are not sufficient
to fully contain Russian politicization, even against a relatively ‘benign’
set of assumptions about Russia's payoffs. Rather they can reduce the
incidence of politicization and render it occasional or episodic rather
than constant through the mixed strategy in Scenario 1. Second, even
the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Russian gas suppliers may be in-
sufficient to fully contain Russian politicization as in equilibrium Russia
is likely to adopt a strategic pricing strategy to counter the costs of the
sanctions.
A key challenge for Europe that emerges from this model, particu-
larly in Scenario 1, is that of committing to diversification. If Europe
commits to diversification in this scenario, a ‘benign’ Russia avoids
politicization. But if Russia is not politicizing, then Europe is best off
not diversifying which tempts Europe to back away from commitments
to diversify as currently seems to be happening with the development of
Nord Stream 2. When Europe is not diversifying, this renders it more
vulnerable to politicization and tempts Russia to return to its politici-
zation strategy. As we demonstrate, what results is a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which the commitment problems for Europe (to di-
versification) and for Russia (to not politicizing) generate a pattern of
episodic diversification and politicization.
In the face of European commitment problems, one approach for the
United States would involve using sanctions to restrict the use of
Russian natural gas. As discussed above, the U.S. explicitly threatened
sanctions in 2019 in response to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. In
Section 4 we show that the effectiveness of sanctions as a measure can
potentially be blunted in equilibrium by Russian price policy. If Russia
exercises enough flexibility concerning price, then U.S. sanctions
measures will not be able to prevent the reemergence of the commit-
ment problems and politicization discussed above.
Thus, the overall picture is a mixed one. Even as the U.S. shale gas
boom and competitive global markets constrain both its politicization
and pricing power, Russia retains a certain capacity to exploit its
powerful position as a primary supplier to the European market for
episodic exercises in politicization.
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